William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review
Volume 23 (1998-1999)
Issue 3 Symposium 1999: Land Use for the 21st
Century: The Next Frontier for Environmental
Law

Article 4

October 1999

Eight Principles for Property Rights in the Anti-Sprawl Age
Eric T. Freyfogle

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons

Repository Citation
Eric T. Freyfogle, Eight Principles for Property Rights in the Anti-Sprawl Age, 23 Wm. & Mary
Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 777 (1999), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr/vol23/iss3/4
Copyright c 1999 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship
Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr

EIGHT PRINCIPLES FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE ANTISPRAWL AGE

ERIC T. FREYFOGLE"

I. THE PATH TO THE PRESENT
In 1876 in Middlesex, England, a dispute broke out between the
occupants of two adjoining houses on Hackney Road. One house, long used
as a dwelling, was taken over by timber merchants who rebuilt it for
commercial use. The merchants increased the height of the building and
proceeded to store piles of timber on the rooftop. Next door lived the
plaintiff who used the several fireplaces in his home for both heating and
cooking. The effect of the timber merchants' extensive remodeling, along
with the stored timber, was to block the winds that naturally blew across the
neighborhood rooftops, thereby disrupting the draft of the plaintiffs
chimneys. Smoke that had risen up for decades now blew down and into the
plaintiffs house. The plaintiffs fireplaces became unusable, and his
enjoyment of the house was disturbed.
The plaintiff sought redress in an action in nuisance, and in time, the
"Max L. Rowe Professor of Law, University of Illinois. B.A. 1973, Lehigh University;
J.D. 1976, University of Michigan. My thanks go to friends Clark Bullard and Bruce
Hannon for offering useful comments on a draft of this article.
One of my chief scholarly aims over the past decade has been to search for ways of
conceiving private property rights that are consistent with the history and vital aims of
that institution and that foster the long-term health of the land community-a community
that includes people as well as all other life forms and the physical parts and processes of
the planet. I have sought, and still seek, to combine the American legal tradition and its
longstanding concerns with both the persuasive, foundational ideas of ecology,
environmental ethics, and environmental history, and a much-needed respect for our vast
ignorance about the natural world. I have taken the opportunity posed by this
symposium to draw together in brief compass many of the observations and conclusions
that I have set forth in various writings over the past half dozen years. Due to this
article's close link to my previous writings, which consider points in more detail, my
footnotes largely direct readers to those other writings and, indirectly, to the sources cited
in them. As in my other writings generally, I focus here not on the details of specific
policy options but on foundational issues that scholars typically bypass. In an upcoming
article, I lament inattentiveness, which I view as a source of weakness in contemporary
scholarship. See generally Eric T. Freyfogle, Five Paths of EnvironmentalScholarship,
1999 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 1999).
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suit made its way through the Common Pleas Division to the Court of
Appeal. Out of the case came the opinion entitled Bryant v. Lefever, and it
provides a revealing glimpse of how late nineteenth-century jurists had come
to understand the property rights held by owners of land. The court began its
ruling with a lyrical statement of what it meant to own land under the AngloAmerican common law:
What then is the right of land and its owner or occupier? It is
to have all natural incidents and advantages, as nature would
produce them; there is a right to all the light and heat that
would come, to all the rain that would fall, to all the wind that
would blow; a right that the rain, which would pass over the
land, should not be stopped and made to fall on it; a right that
the heat from the sun should not be stopped and reflected on
it, a right that the wind should not be checked, but should be
able to escape freely .... '
This was the agrarian vision of property, and it made sense in a world where
dwellings were scattered, land uses modest, and people grew food on their
soil.3 The rule protected homes, small farms, and other sensitive land uses.
It secured an owner's quiet enjoyment, not just against government
interference, but also against noisy, polluting, or otherwise disruptive land
uses by neighbors. By the mid-nineteenth century, though, this agrarian
vision no longer comported with the prevailing values and practices of an
industrializing culture. A property law scheme that protected one
landowner's rights to wind, sun, clean water, and natural drainage,
necessarily limited the rights of other landowners to undertake industrial and
commercial land uses. For industry to prosper, a different regime of landed
property rights was needed, one that allowed an owner to use land intensively
and that consequently, limited any right of quiet enjoyment based on the
land's natural features.
14

C.P.D. 172 (1879). Bryant v. Lefever is also reported with different introductory notes

at 48 Q.B.D. 380. My summary of the facts of the dispute is a conglomeration of the
introductory notes from each of the two case reporters.
24 C.P.D. at 175-76; 48 Q.B.D. at 381-82.
' See Eric T. Freyfogle, The Owning and Taking of Sensitive Lands, 43 UCLA L. REV.
77, 99-101 (1995). See also WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND
REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996) (considering this issue in its
regulatory context).
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By the time the smoking-chimney dispute reached the Court of
Appeal in 1879, this agrarian vision of peaceful coexistence had become
qualified in an important way. As the court explained, a landowner still
nominally enjoyed the right to the natural incidents of the land.4 But that
right had been limited by the right of neighboring landowners to engage in
common, ordinary, and lawful land uses-uses that were, in the
industrializing economy of the day, increasingly disruptive of wind, rain, and
light. "[Flor the benefit of the community," the court explained, landowners
"have and must have rights" to use property in whatever ways such property
was "commonly and lawfully used."' So long as a landowner's activity was
"ordinary and lawful" under the evolving standards of the day, a court would
not label it a nuisance.6 The Court of Appeal employed this rule, in all
likelihood, because the rule seemed appropriate to facilitate or at least
accommodate the more intensive land uses of the age. In doing so, it
embraced, and translated into law, the pro-development sentiments of its day.
On the facts of the particular dispute, the timber merchant's activity fit
within the court's rule. The defendant's land use was lawful and thus the
plaintiffs case lacked merit.
In two other ways the Court of Appeal's ruling further protected
intensive land users, thereby aiding development and, in the process,
changing the bundle of rights that landowners held. Prior decisions often
protected agrarian land uses by giving priority in land-use disputes to the land
use first in time.7 Because intensive uses commonly began later, a rule
favoring pre-exiting land uses effectively limited where and how intensively
industrialization could occur. But as the court in Bryant saw matters, an early
land use by one owner did not diminish the rights of adjoining landowners;
it placed "no greater burden or disability on what the adjoining owners could
do, at least with respect to air flows."8 Priority in time, in short, gave a
landowner no greater claim to protection, and hence, was irrelevant in
resolving disputes. Equally indicative of the court's pro-development slant
was its willingness to take the underlying factual issue away from the jury.9
As the jury in Bryant saw matters, the timber-erecting landowner had
'See 4 C.P.D. at 177, 48 Q.B.D. at 382.
'See 4 C.P.D. at 176, 48 Q.B.D. at 382.
6 See id.
7

See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION
(1977).
8
Bryant v. Lefever, 4 C.P.D. 172, 175 (1879).
'See id. at 179.

OF AMERICAN LAW
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engaged in a nuisance, causing harm by reversing the smoke's flow. The
appellate court, in sharp contrast, saw the causation chain leading in the
opposing direction: "[i]t is the plaintiff who causes the nuisance by lighting
a coal fire in the place the chimney of which is placed so near the defendant's
wall, that the smoke does not escape .... Let the plaintiff cease to light his
fire, let him move the chimney, let him carry it higher, and there would be no
nuisance."1° It was the plaintiff, not the defendant, who caused the problem.
The jury's verdict, accordingly, could not stand.
The legal rules and reasoning that came together in Bryant v. Lefever
were perfectly suited to aid industrialization, at least when wielded by
supportive judges. And for several generations these ideas held sway, both
in the United States and England. One can easily trace the reasoning behind
the case up through the mid-twentieth century, although courts by then had
modified slightly their phrasings. In 1954, for instance, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania in Waschak v. Moffat" considered whether a coal mine
operator committed a nuisance when destructive gases from its waste pile
turned neighboring houses black and left area residents sickened." The court
began its resolution of the case, as had the court in Bryant, by expressing the
general rule: a landowner could use land only in ways that did not injure
neighbors.13 By implication, neighbors had the right to complain if the use
and enjoyment of their land was disrupted in any material way. This nomaterial-injury rule, like the natural-incidents rule applied in Bryant, was
qualified, however, by the right of each landowner to engage in "the natural
use and enjoyment of his own property."' 4 So long as the land use was
"normal and customary" and caused no intentional injury-so long, that is,
as a land use was "reasonable"-no nuisance occurred. 5
On the facts in Waschak, the court saw obvious benefit to the
community in the mining operation, and the operation was conducted, it
believed, in a non-negligent manner. For the court, the community's interest
was plain to see: "one's bread is more important than landscape or clear
0

Id.

" 109 A.2d 310 (Pa. 1954).

Although the majority indicated that paint damage was the only injury the plaintiff
suffered, see Waschak v. Moffat, 109 A.2d 310, 312 (1954), the dissent characterized the
facts differently when it discussed not only paint damage, but tarnishing effects on metals
and testimony as to acute toxicity and chronic health effects of hydrogen sulfide gas. See
id. at 318 (Mussmano, J., dissenting).
3
Seeid.at 313-14.
4
1 Id.at 317.
12

"5See id.
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skies,"" it proclaimed, quoting from an earlier ruling. "Without smoke,

Pittsburgh would have remained a very pretty village."' 7 So ready was the
court to protect the coal-operation that it followed the lead of Bryant and
viewed the issue as a question of law, not one for a jury to assess.
By the time of Washak, land and property rights at common law
had plainly shifted far from their agrarian roots. Out on the landscape, with
its smoky skies and polluted rivers, the change was easy enough to see. In
the law reports, however, the judicial writing style masked much of that
change, giving a misleading aura of continuity. Landowners were still
protected in their quiet enjoyment of the land, just as they had been two
centuries earlier, and landowners could engage only in land uses that were
natural, customary, lawful, or reasonable. By the twentieth century, however,
those words as applied led to far different outcomes than they had generations
earlier. They were vague, flexible words, with plenty of room for courts to
maneuver within them. There was room to shift the outcomes of land-use
disputes to reflect, not just the different policy slants of the judges
themselves, but the evolving values of their home cultures.
In retrospect, Waschak stood at the end of an era, one of the last
decisions to allow intensive industries to run roughshod over neighboring
homeowners.8 One judge in the case, disliking the outcome, wanted to get
the jury involved, perhaps sensing that a jury's assessment would differ
markedly from the majority's." Another dissenting judge challenged the
majority more openly: "I do not think that there can be any doubt the constant
smell of rotten eggs constitutes a nuisance. If such a condition is not
recognized by the law, then the law is the only body that does not so
recognize it."20
Even before Washak was handed down, new winds were blowing. 2
In California, courts were struggling to make sense of a jumbled and
6 Id. at

316 (quoting Versailes Borough v. McKeesport Coal & Coke Co., 83 Pittsb.
Legal J. 379 (1935)).
"7Id. (quoting Versailes Borough v. McKeesport Coal & Coke Co., 83 Pittsb. Leg. J. 379
(1935)) (emphasis added).
" One of the last, but by no means the final one. See, e.g., Homewood Fishing Club v.
Archer Daniels Midland Co., 605 N.E.2d 1140 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (setting aside, due to
a failure to show negligence, both compensatory and punitive damages awarded against a
major industry engaged in knowing, long-term violations of the Clean Water Act).
"Waschak v. Moffat, 109 A.2d 310, 318 (Pa. 1954) (Jones, J., dissenting).
20 Id. at 321 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
21 See Eric T. Freyfogle, Community and the Market in Modern American Property Law,
in LAND, PROPERTY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (John F. Richards ed., forthcoming 2000).
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misguided water rights regime that placed few limits on what water owners
could do. Nominally the law limited appropriative rights to uses that were
beneficial and reasonable; like landowners, water-rights owners had no
absolute rights of use. Under this vague standard, however, even the most
consumptive, polluting, and ecologically destructive water uses had seemed
beneficial when pro-development values were at their peak. By the 1930s,
the state's Supreme Court recognized that change was needed. In terms of
verbal formulation, the law remained little changed: a water rights holder was
still obligated merely to use water in a way that was socially beneficial. Like
the terms "natural," "customary," and "ordinary," however, the term
"beneficial" was inherently flexible and responsive. It was linked, like other
property norms were linked, to the well being of the overall community, and
it shifted along with the court's conception of the common good: "What is a
beneficial use, of course," the court explained,
depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. What
may be a reasonable beneficial use, where water is present in
excess of all needs, would not be a reasonable beneficial use
in an area of great scarcity and great need. What is a
beneficial use at one time may, because of changed
conditions, become a waste of water at a later time.22
By the final quarter of the twentieth century, decisions like Washak
had come to seem like relics from a discredited past. Environmental values
had become entrenched. Quality-of-life issues demanded that polluters
change their ways. With its built-in flexibility, the common law had no
trouble accommodating these new values, just as it had shifted easily to
accommodate the old ones. One case illustrative of this flexibility, prominent
because of its unusual facts, was the Wisconsin Supreme Court's ruling in
Prahv. Maretti.23 There, the court considered whether a homeowner with a
roof-top solar panel could assert a nuisance claim against a neighboring
landowner, whose newly constructed home partially blocked the sun's rays.
The dispute was novel, but the court needed no new language to resolve it.
No landowner, the court reiterated, has "an absolute or unlimited right to use
the land in a way that injures the rights of others. The rights of neighboring
22 See

Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972, 1007

(Cal.
1935).
23
See 321 N.W.2d 182.
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landowners are relative; the uses by one must not unreasonably impair the
uses or enjoyment of the other."24 The key issue, the court said, was simply
one of reasonableness-just as the Pennsylvania court in Waschak had
announced. A landowner's use rights were limited by a duty to act
reasonably, and what was reasonable was determined with a clear focus on
the needs of society as a whole. Under the circumstances of the day, a new
home that substantially and unnecessarily interfered with a solar collector
might well be unreasonable. Decades before, the court admitted frankly, it
had embraced a more pro-development slant in its rulings, just as most other
courts had done. But that policy, the court said, "of favoring unhindered
private development in an expanding economy, [was] no longer in harmony
with the realities of our society. The need for easy and rapid development is
not as great today as it once was ... ."' It was wrong to adhere to policy
values that had "lost their vigor over the course of the years.'26
II. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE ANTI-SPRAWL AGE
These brief scenes from the common law's long history help establish
a context for understanding how private property in coming decades might
fit together with the kinds of new regulatory measures that now seem needed
to control suburban sprawl and mitigate related land-use problems.
According to a common misunderstanding of property's legal history,
private property began as an absolute, abstract bundle of rights that a
landowner could exercise with little or no constraint.27 Those rights remained
near total, the tale goes, until the modem era of regulation, when land-use
rules cut away the bundle, more and more, to the point where landowners
sometimes possessed merely a rind or residue of what they once owned. That
story has little basis in history 8 yet it remains vibrant, coloring popular
understandings of what private ownership ought to mean. It stands as a
central element of the individualistic worldview that uses property rights as
a tool to undercut unwanted constraints. The popularity of this property myth
24

Id. at 187.

25

Id. at 190 (citations omitted).

26id.

See John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use and Its Significancefor Modern Takings
Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1252 (1996).
28See id. at 1281 ("The first century and a half of private land ownership in America
reveals no sign of the later-imagined right of landowners to be let alone as long as they
do not harm others .... [T]he landowner's right to control and utilize land remained
subject to an obligation to further important community objectives.").
27
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poses a profound challenge to conservation advocates.
Private property is a central institution in American culture. It is one
of the pieces that give the nation its identity, and it has helped account both
for the vigor of American democracy and the nation's remarkable economic
growth. Yet if private property has been a strength and virtue, it has also
been a liability. Left alone, landowners too often look after their individual
interests and act in ways that undercut the well being of surrounding lands
and people. 9 Environmental degradation is one of the several disturbing
results. Many land uses, appropriate enough in isolation, become
problematic when lots of landowners engage in them." Particularly over the
past century, intensive land uses have spread all across the landscape, giving
rise to new forms of ecological degradation. Ecosystem processes are
disrupted in ways that threaten the long-term fertility and health of entire
regions. Landscape beauty has suffered, and unregulated congestion has
helped separate people from nature in ways that diminish human life. Then
there are slow-developing problems, unseen by the ordinary landowner, like
soil degradation and declining biological diversity.
These land-use environmental problems are, for the most part, ones
that landowners acting alone cannot solve. No landowner alone can protect
a riparian corridor, keep an aquifer from being polluted, preserve the beauty
of a mountainside, keep a wandering animal species from going extinct, solve
a watershed's flooding problem, or foster a landscape with appealing
recreational opportunities. Sometimes a landowner can improve a problem
modestly by using private land wisely. Other times, however, a landowner
acting alone is helpless to mitigate a problem. For landowners in the latter
category, the question is not whether to forgo land degradation for the
common good, it is whether to forgo land degradation merely to cleanse
one's conscience, knowing that the community will not materially benefit; or
knowing that, if some benefit does accrue, it will largely go to neighbors who
continue their degradation.3 The problem here is what is sometimes termed
the "tyranny of small decisions. 3 2 It is a tyranny that comes, not principally
29 See, e.g., Alison Reiser, Ecological Preservationas a Public Right: An

Emerging Doctrine in Search of a Theory, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 393, 420

(1991) (stating that wetland systems may be degraded by disparate acts separated in
space and time).
31 See id. at 420-21 (arguing that natural systems are vulnerable to cumulative effects).
This is one of several points overlooked by commentators who claim that citizens
express their "true" values and choices when they make isolated transactions in the
"

market.
32 Reiser, supra note 29, at 424.
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because people acting alone so often focus on themselves and the shortterm-although that is a serious problem-but because people acting
separately simply lack the powers and options that communities possess, and
lack too the time and knowledge to understand many problems. Most
environmental land-use problems, suburban sprawl among them, can be
understood and described only on a scale well above the individual land
parcel. And they are solvable only by coordinated, collective measures that
are equally far reaching.
If solutions to such problems are going to succeed, they need to fit
together with the institution of private land ownership. To the extent they
change the institution-as inevitably they will-they need to do so in ways
that maintain its core values, economically, politically, and socially.33 To be
sure, there is no reason to maintain, and every reason to resist, the nowpopular declensionist tale of landed property-of private rights as once
absolute, now battered and degraded. The destruction of this myth, however,
represents the atypical task where a sledgehammer is the appropriate tool.
For the most part, subtle and thoughtful work is needed to reconceive and
reshape landed property rights for the new age of regional planning. This is
fundamental work, in that it needs to get back to the fundamental bases of the
institution: the reasons why private property exists, how it has related over
the years to the community today that supports and protects it, and how a
community today might rightfully use the institution instrumentally to help
achieve its evolving goals.34

How then should private property be conceived today, in an era of
increasing concern over landscape-scale problems? What principles might
usefully guide the continued evolution of landed property rights in the antisprawl age?
1. Propertyas an OrganicInstitution
For starters, property's history needs to be told better. No historian,
of course, can write with full detachment, but many stories of property's past
are seriously flawed by any standard, driven by dogma and intended to
support policy approaches based on other grounds. Probably the most
important lessons of good history are that landowner rights have changed

33
14

See Eric T. Freyfogle, The Particulars of Owning, 25 ECOL. L. Q. 574, 574 (1999).
See ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, BOUNDED PEOPLE, BOUNDLESS LANDS: ENVISIONING A NEW

LAND ETHIC

140-44 (1998).
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significantly over time, and that they varied from setting to setting.3" To
phrase the point differently: property is a living, breathing institution, with
ownership norms that evolve right along with other elements of a culture.
Sometimes such change occurs overtly, as when statutes are passed and when
courts openly rewrite rules, replacing one verbal formulation with another.
But as the cases mentioned in Part I illustrate, important changes often occur
without overt shifts in language. They are hidden within the shifting
applications of terms such as "reasonable," "ordinary," and "beneficial."
This initial point, that property rights change over time, ought to be
so obvious as hardly to warrant comment, and perhaps it would be but for the
influence of libertarian and free-market theorists, who have been anxious to
transform private property rights into a static bundle of individual rights,
immune from democratic tinkering.36 One common aim of such work is to
turn landed property rights into a pure market commodity, firmly and clearly
bounded and readily transferred." As a policy option, there are points to be
said for this objective, as well as against it. Bad history, however, only
hinders the discussion. Private property has served its purposes well for
generations, including its economic purposes, even as lawmakers reshaped
it in response to shifting communal needs.38 Those who argue for an end to
such flexibility need to explain, better than they have, why the community
needs to relinquish its power.
One vital implication of property's organic evolution is that property
owners need to base their forward-looking expectations, not just on what the
law books say at the time, but on where society and social values are heading.
It simply is not reasonable, nor is it fair to other citizens, for a person to buy
land based on the law in effect and then expect that law to remain forever
unchanged. Land uses, like all other human activities, are subject to evolving
" See Freyfogle, supra note 3, at 97-106. See also, Eric T. Freyfogle, Ethics,
Community, and Private Land, 23 ECOL. L. Q. 631, 641-46 (1996) [hereinafter
Freyfogle, Ethics] (discussing the rise of Americans' misplaced notions of land and
nature as commodities ripe for economic exploitation).
36

See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF

EMINENT DOMAIN 5 (1985).
31

See TERRY ANDERSON & DONALD LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM 20

(1991).
38 This is not to deny, of course, that property rights must enjoy considerable stability to
serve their economic functions, nor is it to overlook that benefits accrue from a popular
image of property rights as relatively static. Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund discussed the
latter point in Takings and the Nature of Property, 9 CANADIAN J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE
161 (1996).
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legal norms. A landowner's expectations ,are reasonable and deserve
protection only when they are kept in line, not just with the law, but also with
prevailing communal values and understandings. 9
2. Ownership and the Common Good
Along with regaining a better sense of private property's history,
there is a need to reattach ownership norms more overtly to the good of the
surrounding community. This point, too, ought to require little elaboration,
but popular understanding of the point is weak, and libertarian rhetoric has
pushed forward a far different understanding.4"
The standard libertarian story draws, in one way or another, upon the
tale told by John Locke: that private property began back when humans lived
in a state of nature, and that civil government was created to protect it.4I
Aside from its lack of historical grounding this story makes no sense, given
that property is inherently a social institution, one that sets norms for conduct
within a social order.42 A person can own a thing only if other people
recognize that ownership and, typically, only if a communal enforcement
mechanism exists to protect it. For such rights to exist, and particularly for
an enforcement mechanism to exist, a human community is first needed, one
in which people sense shared ties and intermingled fates. Generations ago
lawyers knew this perfectly well, for property law as they knew it was merely
a collection of remedies (forms of action) such as trespass and nuisance.43
Without such remedies, and the court system that stood ready to dispense
them, property at law meant nothing.
Property rights are sanctioned and supported within communities
9 I refer here to expectations about an owner's ability to develop vacant land or to make
significant changes in existing land uses; a far different case, calling for far greater
protection, is presented when a landowner merely wants to continue an existing use. See
Freyfogle, supra note 33, at 585-87.
40 Professor Epstein's Takings provides a conspicuous illustration of such rhetoric,
presenting property as a counter-majoritarian individual right that arose solely to protect
individuals from governmental action. See EPSTEIN, supra note 36, at 5.
"' See, e.g., id. For critiques of libertarian uses of Lockean ideas, especially by Professor
Epstein, see Eric T. Freyfogle, Owning the Land: Four Contemporary Narratives, 13 J.
LAND USE& ENVTL. L. 279, 286-92 (1998); Freyfogle, Ethics, supra note 35, at 633-38.
42 See, e.g., Joseph William Singer & Jack M. Beerman, The Social Originsof Property,
6 CANADIAN J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 217, 241 (1993) (discussing the communal origins
of land-use norms).
43 For a discussion of the old forms of action and their continued
importance, see
generally JOSEPH H. KOFFLER& ALISON REPPY, COMMON LAW PLEADING (1969).
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because community members collectively decide or sense, in one way or
another, that a private-property regime will benefit them. Economic scarcity
often has something to do with that decision, and so do desires for privacy.
Decisions are made, however, not by invisible forces, but by lawmakers
acting for a collective people. Communities have little reason to respect and
enforce property rights that leave them worse off. When the court in Bryant
sided with the timber-stacking landowner, it did so "for the benefit of the
community... ."' When the Pennsylvania court protected the polluting coal
processor, it did so because of the perceived communal importance of bread
over landscape and clear skies. And when the Wisconsin court in Prah
decided to protect solar panels, it did so because the old, pro-development
view was simply no longer good public policy.
Now, to say that private property needs to promote the common good
is not to say that a community could not give landowners considerable
security in their vested rights. Secure rights can often benefit a community,
just as insecure rights can prompt owners to use land unwisely. Secure
individual rights, however, are justifiable only by reference to the collective
good, not by reference to a mythical, pre-social stage in human history, nor
by appeal to an inherent right of property that somehow exists independently
of lawmaking processes.
What confuses this issue today is the reality that landowners
inevitably belong to multiple communities of differing sizes, from the most
local to the national and now, even the global. For generations, land-use
issues were sufficiently local that detailed questions were properly the
province of local-level lawmakers. State lawmakers had interests, but their
concerns were adequately addressed by statewide norms establishing the
basic elements of ownership. Today, many local communities lack power to
control the economic forces driving land-use decisions. In addition, intensive
land uses and greater ecological awareness have led to heightened concerns
about the impacts of land uses on landscape-scale, ecosystem processes. In
the case of particularly vital elements of the natural world, national and even
international communities now routinely express concerns about the ways
critical private lands are used.
Much work is still needed to consider how lawmaking power is best
allocated among levels of government so that private land-use practices are
sufficiently in line with the well being of all levels of community.45 One
44Bryant v. Lefever, 4 C.P.D. 172, 176 (1879).

See Freyfogle, supra note 33, at 580-82.
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commonly held view, based on the subsidiarity'principle of international law,
is that power is best exercised by the lowest level of government that is
willing and able to handle it.46 The idea has merit, but even so, it merely
supplies a beginning point for what ought to be a pragmatic inquiry into the
best means of dividing up the long-term work.
3. Clarifying the Common Good
Of course, to speak of the necessary link between private property
and the good of a community is to presuppose that there is such a good,
however vaguely defined and evolving, and that the common good can
supply a polestar for reshaping the entitlements of ownership. That
assumption is sometimes a hard one to accept, and no small amount of
disagreement surrounds it. In thinking about property, however, it is useful
to distinguish disagreements about the nature of the common good from more
radical claims that there is no common good apart from the good of
individuals conceived separately. Disagreements of the former nature are
legitimate and, in all likelihood, never ending. Disagreements of the latter
type, however, cut more deeply into communal powers and decision-making
processes, and indeed into the very idea of a community-supported system
of private rights.
The denial of all concept of the common good is, at bottom, largely
inconsistent with the idea of private property in a democratic system, for
private property is an inherently social institution and can only arise out of
a shared vision of the good. That vision might provide for maximum
individual liberty; it might, alternatively, focus more on the achievement of
goals and values that require concerted action. Whatever the vision, property
law necessarily must perform certain minimal functions. It must define what
it means to own land, and to do that it must perform the kind of analysis the
courts undertook in Bryant, Waschak, and Prah:
* decide how intensively landowners can develop and use their lands
and, correspondingly, when landowners can complain about the
conduct of their neighbors;
* draw a similar line between the land-use rights of individual owners,
and the rights of the community to complain about external harms
that spread widely;
46
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decide whether landowners do or do not have the right to destroy or
consume what they own, such as the right to till fields in ways that
gradually erode or exhaust the soil; and
* decide what rights landowners will have to change natural drainage
patterns, to alter existing wildlife habitat and vegetative patterns, and
to pollute waters and air.
Where lines such as these are drawn is open to debate. What is
certain is that property regimes necessarily must draw the lines somewhere;
there is no null or default option that allows government to avoid the issues.
And the only basis for drawing them--or rather, the only legitimate basis,
given the many illegitimate ones-is the overall good of the lawmaking
community.
One of the shortcomings of environmental policy as it begins the new
century is that it has paid inadequate attention to overall conservation goals.
There has been a particularly disturbing reluctance to phrase goals in terms
of the common good.47 Like other social movements, the conservation
movement has largely drawn upon the nation's prevailing liberal rhetoric,
which focuses at the level of the individual, not the community. In the case
of the conservation movement this tendency is a surprising one, given that
environmental thought draws extensively upon principles of community
ecology and interconnection, and given that its depictions of humans in
nature portray them, not as autonomous individuals, but as social beings
necessarily embedded in social and ecological communities.
To deal successfully with suburban sprawl and other landscape-scale
problems, the community's overall good needs to come into far sharper focus,
and today's various, interrelated land-use problems need to be discussed, not
in terms of conflicting individual interests, but in terms of that shared good.
Often the common good is discussed in terms of sustainability or sustainable
development-terms that are notoriously vague, and perhaps popular in large
part for that very reason.48 I have elsewhere argued in favor of land health as
an overall goal, one that links ecological-sustainability issues together with
issues of ethics and aesthetics, and that incorporates processes for citizens to
make choices about their homes.49 Aldo Leopold used the phrase "land
health," and he proposed it as a goal to unify the disjointed conservation
"

" For a discussion of this issue in the context of legal scholarship see generally
Freyfogle, supra note *.
48 See FREYFOGLE, supra note 34, at 50-51.
9

See id. at 48-59.
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efforts of his day." Many contemporary commentators have used variants
of that phrase, including "ecosystem health" and "integrity."'" All such
phrases suffer from vagueness, and inevitably so, but they can gain needed
detail through specific application.
More important than the exact phrasing of a collective conservation
goal is the need to have such a goal; one phrased in terms of the common
good and conceived broadly enough to include ecological, ethical, aesthetic,
economic, and general quality-of-life issues.
4. Redefining Land-Use Harm
A critical need in the dawning century-vital to efforts to deal with
sprawl and other landscape-scale issues-is to reaffirm the link between
property rights and the common good. Landowners should be viewed as
community members, with duties to that community, and communities ought
to have the power to set fair yet demanding standards for membership,
standards aimed at promoting the good of the entire land community.
One needed reform of property rights is to define land-use harm so
that it links more directly and fully to the community's overall conservation
goal. Land uses that degrade ecosystems need to be viewed as harmful, and
overtly labeled as such, just like industrial pollution is today. Unsustainable
forestry, grazing, and tillage practices should all be called into question when
they plainly degrade the land's long-term fertility. Particular attention needs
to be paid to those harms that arise because the land's carrying capacity is
exceeded. In this latter category are harms such as the excessive modification
of hydrologic systems, the destruction of wildlife habitat, and various forms
of land-cover change. There are also more peculiar harms, harder to
categorize, such as the introduction or fostering of invasive alien plant and
animal species. The idea of unlawful harm needs to be linked, not only to the
functioning of the land ecologically, but also to the quality of present-day
human life, so that harm at law can also entail material degradations of shared
See ALDO LEOPOLD, The Land-Health Concept and Conservation,in FOR THE HEALTH
OF THE LAND (J. Baird Callicott & Eric T. Freyfogle eds., 1999). 1 consider Leopold's
50

concept of land health, and its connection to his (perhaps unfortunately) more famous
land ethic, in A Sand County Almanac at 50.'Leopold in the New Century, 30 EVTL. L.
REP. _ (forthcoming Jan. 2000).

"' See generally, e.g., ECOSYSTEM HEALTH: NEW GOALS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
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aesthetic landscapes. Finally, harm needs to focus, not only on how one
landowner disturbs neighbors, but how a landowner treats the land that she
owns. Soil erosion, for example, is a communal harm, whether or not eroded
soil crosses on to a neighbor's land or pollutes a shared waterway. Property
law needs to get rid of the notion that landowners inherently possess the right
to destroy what they own.
5. TailoringRights to the Land
One effect of defining land-use harm in ecological terms is that a
landowner's bundle of land-use rights becomes tailored to the natural features
of the land that is owned. 2 In a community that embraces an overall goal
such as land health, ecosystem integrity, or even-sustainable living, land uses
need to become consistent with the promotion of those goals. Some lands
will be suitable for development; others will not. Some farm fields will be
suitable for occasional plowing; others will not. Some wetlands might
properly be drained; others should not. In the natural world, parcels of land
differ greatly. For humans to live on the land in perpetuity, they need to pay
attention to many of those differences. As Wendell Berry and Wes Jackson
have eloquently noted, nature must stand as a critical measure for good land
3
use.

5

Of course for humans to live and thrive in a place they need to make
alterations to the pre-human landscape. There is no need, nor any proposal,
to define all human alteration as harmful. What is needed is respect for
nature's limits and a sensitivity to place, together with mature reflection on
humankind's ethical duties to other life forms, future generations, and the
land community as such. Out of such reflection and study can come,
however awkwardly and tentatively, an understanding of how a community
ought to live in a place, and from that understanding can come a sense of the
limits properly placed on private property rights. Some land-use practices,
such as abnormal soil erosion, should be viewed as inherently harmful and
treated as such. In the case of other land-use harms, however, the question
is more one of scale and scope, and ownership norms need tailoring so that
landscape-scale limits are shared fairly among similarly situated landowners.
52
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The legal community has shown surprising resistance to the idea that
property rights might properly arise out of the land itself, with an owner's
land-use options limited and shaped by the land's natural features. 4 Indeed,
it remains common for scholars to talk of property rights abstractly, without
regard for nature, as if ownership norms in practice had not changed
dramatically in recent decades, but they have changed: laws protecting
wetlands, forests, flood plains, endangered species habitat, erodible soils, and
shifting barrier islands-these and similar laws supply bountiful evidence
that land-use rights are already tailored to the land, and have been for years."
Visions of landed property rights as abstract bundles are as inaccurate
descriptively as they are misguided normatively. Context already counts, and
it needs to count, in particular ways, for even more. 6 Nature needs to play
an even greater role in the lawmaking process."
6. Sharing the Benefits of Development
One problem that arises from the above suggestions is that they
quickly lead to an awkward place. With land-use harm redefined, with
property rights more tailored to the land's natural features, and with
communities regulating land uses in furtherance of the common good,
landowner rights end up varying significantly from parcel to parcel." Some
lands remain suitable for development and intensive use; other lands are
restricted from use, sometimes severely. Not just use options but land values
diverge widely, and as more lands are restricted, even greater value attaches
to those particular lands that are suitable, and legally marked, for
development.
The obvious difficulty here has to do with fairness to landowners.
Why should some landowners get to develop and others not? Why should the
" See, e.g., Freyfogle, supra note 33 at 585 ("Slowly, and painfully, people are coming
to think that landowner rights should somehow depend on the natural features of the
parcel owned.").
" See id.
56
See generally Eric T. Freyfogle, Context and Accommodation in Modern PropertyLaw,
41 STAN. L. REv. 1529 (1989) (arguing that property rights in nature are becoming more
content specific). See, e.g., Freyfogle, supra note 33, at 585 ("People are coming to
think that landowner rights should somehow depend on the natural features of the parcel
owned.").
" I do not mean here that nature alone can supply rules of ownership without the need for
interpretation and action by human lawmakers. See Freyfogle, supra note 29, 301-03.
51 See Freyfogle, supra note 33, at 584-86.
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gain go to some and not all? And how can these differences in treatment be
consistent with the nation's commitment to equal treatment under law?
At one level, these questions are easy to answer. Land-use rights
differ because land parcels differ. Development in one place can have
impacts that differ markedly from the same development elsewhere.5 9 In the
market, location greatly influences land values and land-use possibilities, so
the idea is hardly new. At law, the same has also been true, and is becoming
more so. Landowners have never had the right to engage in land uses that
cause harm, and harm has long been dependent on context. A land use
acceptable in one place may be a nuisance in another. Today, the context that
needs to count is not just the human context and the built environment, but
the natural environment as well.6"
These answers may suffice for conservationists and ardent
community supporters, but they are not fully satisfactory for most citizens.
The answers probably justify bans on land uses that plainly appear harmful,
such as building homes in a floodplain or draining lands that are obviously
wetlands. They do not, however, adequately justify restrictions of activities
that are less plainly harmful, such as land uses that are harmful only when too
many people engage in them, causing natural and social systems to become
overloaded. Particularly in these cases, involving non-obvious harms to the
land's carrying capacity, regulatory schemes need to pay especially careful
attention to the issue of landowner fairness.
One way to interject more fairness in such a case-although typically
not a good way-is to divide the total development load among landowners
so that each landowner can develop to a limited extent. This approach is
used, for instance, when large minimum lot sizes for home building are used
as a way to cap overall construction. The obvious difficulty with this
approach is that, while it limits overall land alteration, it fails to locate
development in areas that best serve the community's interests. Communities
that take this approach cannot focus development around existing
infrastructures and otherwise promote compact settlements. This approach
works tolerably well only when addressing those types of carrying capacity
harm, such as excessive total drainage, where the community is less
concerned about where the land alteration takes place.
The reality is that if plans to control sprawl and similar landscapescale problems are going to succeed, they simply have to exercise a heavy
'9
See id.
60
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hand, much like urban zoning laws and current bans on developing
floodplains. Many landowners need to be told, plain and simple, that they
cannot use their lands intensively. Given this politically harsh reality, the
issue becomes: should the owners of land not suited for intensive use simply
be told to refrain, or should their rights be greater? Should they be
compensated in some way or otherwise have a right to participate in the
economic gains of development? Would compensation, or a shared
participation in development benefits, make a land-use plan fairer, or if not
more fair, at least more politically palatable?
This suite of questions is as urgent as it is vital. One appealing
resolution is to distinguish among types of lands and landowner activities,
imposing outright restrictions on some lands while tempering other
restrictions with compensatory benefits. When development in a place
causes evident harm in the eyes of most citizens-such as when wetlands are
filled-then such lands might simply be restricted outright. Development in
such places is harmful, and the law has typically not paid landowners to halt
a harm. However, when lands are of a type ecologically suited for
development, yet community needs are such that development ought to occur
elsewhere, then an outright ban becomes much less fair. In some manner, the
owners of such lands ought to participate in the economic gains of
development, even though they cannot develop their own lands. In some way
they ought to gain compensation for the restraints imposed on them.
The intellectual leap that needs to take place here is to separate the
right to develop from the right to participate economically in the development
process. In fairness, owners of land suitable for development need to possess
the latter right, but they do not need possess the former. One way to
implement this idea is through the use of transferable development rights
("TDRs"). Rights to develop could be allocated to all owners of land
ecologically suitable for development, with the rights readily transferable.
Rights could be exercised, however, only on lands slated by the community
for development. Some landowners would receive development rights but
be unable to use them on their own lands; their economic participation in
regional development would come by way of selling their rights to others.
Other landowners would receive development rights that they could use on
their own lands, but they could fully develop their lands only by purchasing
additional development rights from other landowners. In this way, some of
the gains in the value of lands suited for development is shifted to the owners
of lands not suited for development. As that happens, the regional plan
becomes more fair and feasible.
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TDRs are not hard to justify when used to protect a landscape's
carrying capacity. If overall development in a landscape needs to be
constrained (e.g., the amount of land drained, paved, or stripped of natural
vegetation), then surely it is legitimate to decide that a landowner has no right
to impose more than his fair-share burden of such development on that
landscape, with any excessive burden deemed a land-use harm. At common
law, landowners had only the right to make reasonable use of the land, with
reasonable defined in terms of the communal good. A fair-share limit on
development merely gives specific meaning to that longstanding tenet. On
the other hand, landowners who are asked to do more than their fair share
deserve some recompense for it, and properly developed TDRs can supply
that recompense.
The old way of dealing with carrying-capacity harms was simply to
allow development to occur until the landscape could handle no more, at
which point the line was drawn. Line drawing, however, is politically
difficult, particularly when those next in line to develop have large sums at
stake. As a consequence, cries of unfairness are often loud. This familiar and
often unsuccessful approach to line drawing relies on the time-honored but
ethically suspect first-in-time method of allocating resources. Other methods
of allocation are often far better, TDR schemes among them.
7. The Taking ofProperty
Landscape-scale planning, like all land-use regulation, occurs under
the ominous specter of the Takings Clause,61 which in a vague and sometimes
frightening way limits how far regulators can go. Ultimately, the law of
regulatory takings is in the hands of the U.S. Supreme Court, and there is
little that regional planners and conservation advocates can do to influence
that law. On the other hand, governments are free to compensate landowners
even when the Constitution does not require it, and they do need to decide for
themselves whether a land-use restriction is or is not fair.
The above ideas about property rights lead to several observations
relevant to the regulatory takings morass.
First, a good sense of property's legal history supports the legitimacy
of communal efforts to redefine land-use harm, keeping it in line with
prevailing values and circumstances. Harm has always been given meaning
U.S. CONST. amend V. The Fifth Amendment provides, in relevant part, "nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Id. (emphasis
added).
61

1999]

EIGHT PRINCIPLES FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS

797

by a community in light of its current needs, and communities have the
legitimate right to restrict land uses that are harmful, without paying
compensation.
Second, when assessing the economic impact of a regulation for
purposes of deciding whether a taking has occurred, it is useful to recall that
landowners at common law did not possess, and do not now possess, the right
to use land in unreasonable ways. Hence, the proper starting point for an
economic impact assessment is not the assumption that landowners can
develop at will. Instead, the starting point is to look at what land uses would
be reasonable in light of the community's then-prevailing values and needs.
The proper question should be: to what extent does a regulation interfere
with reasonable and natural uses of the land, as determined in light of the
community's current values and needs and the overall carrying capacity of the
land? Many regulations, in fact, do little more than give specific meaning to
the common law's longstanding ban on unreasonable land uses, and hence
have no adverse effect on individual private rights.
Third, with a better understanding of the land's carrying capacity
limits, as determined in light of the community's well being, it becomes
easier to decide when a landowner has been asked to do more than his fair
share. The Takings Clause should not stand as a bar to the continued
evolution of ownership norms that apply widely to all similarly situated
landowners. Its principal aim, rather, should be to protect individual
landowners who are unfairly singled out to shoulder more than their shares
of the regulatory burden, taking into account differences among land parcels.
Finally, regulatory takings law would be much improved if courts
would simply recognize that most takings cases present two issues rather than
one: first, what property interests the plaintiff owns, and second, whether
those interests have been unfairly taken. To separate the issues of "property"
and "takings" is to clarify matters considerably.62 Once property is viewed
as an evolving, communally responsive institution, and not an abstract, static
bundle, it takes work to determine what rights a landowner possesses at any
given time. A court cannot simply look to its prior decisions, the writings of
seventeenth-century philosophers, or to the radical proposals of present-day
libertarian economists. Once enacted, laws banning land-use harms, and laws
fairly restricting overall development, become part and parcel of what it
means to own land in a given place-just as much as judicial decisions such
as Bryant, Waschak, and Prah do. Such laws, accordingly, must be taken
62
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into account when deciding the rights a landowner holds. When this is done,
the second step of the inquiry, the takings issue, will likely become far more
manageable. 63 For a court moving to the second step, the pertinent questions
will be these:
" whether a landowner has been restricted from using her lands to a
greater degree than other owners of ecologically similar lands;
* whether a landowner has been asked to share a burden greater than
the burden imposed on other owners of such lands; and
* alternatively, whether a regulation merely halted an activity that the
community now deems harmful when undertaken on lands such as
those at issue.
These ought to be the principal questions, and they require answering
with due recognition for the legitimate needs communities have to embrace
new values, to take into account new circumstances and knowledge, and to
apply their laws prospectively.
8. Rhetoric Counts
In the anti-sprawl age, one of the most vital tasks will be to develop
better ways of talking about land ownership. Ownership needs to be
described in more communal terms, and linked overtly to the well being of
63

A commonly voiced complaint about this line of reasoning is that a Takings Clause

analysis that allows government to rewrite ownership norms effectively removes the
Takings Clause as a limit on governmental action. But it should not take much reflection
to see that this is not so. Under the approach, the Takings Clause serves to distinguish
legitimate changes in ownership norms from government efforts that single out one or a
select group of landowners for ill treatment, without any real shift in widely applicable
norms. That issue ought to stand as a centerpiece of any takings analysis, but it does not,
and will not, until courts more carefully assess the claimant's property rights, before
considering whether government has taken them.
If changes in widely applicable ownership norms can be struck down as unlawful
takings, one wonders how far back in time courts ought to go in striking down legal
changes that fundamentally disadvantaged some landowners (even while they, typically,
greatly advantaged others). A prime candidate for invalidation, at this late date, might
well be the prior appropriation system of water allocation, which in many states deprived
landowners of their riparian water rights. By and large, conservationists might like the
idea of returning property law to where it was in 1791, before the industrializing
influences of the nineteenth century permitted far more intensive resource use practices.
But of course radical writers who seek to turn the clock back generally have no interest in
going so far back; their target is about a century later, when the impulses of
industrialization had done their work and before countervailing tendencies set it. See
Freyfogle, supra note 3, at 119 n.138.
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the community. To be sure, land is an economic commodity for some
purposes, and land does indeed supply independence and privacy to
individual landowners. It is true, too, that landowner expectations need a fair
degree of protection if private property is to continue fulfilling its economic
functions. But a parcel of land is also and irrefutably an arbitrarily defined
piece of a natural community, and landowners necessarily become members
of these communities, just as they become members, responsible or
otherwise, of their surrounding social communities. To belong responsibly
to a community is to have duties to it. Talk that admits and explores such
duties needs to occur just as often as talk about landowner rights.
Aldo Leopold put this final point most famously in the foreword to
his classic, A Sand County Almanac: "[w]e abuse land because we regard it
as a commodity belonging to us. When we see land as a community to which
we belong, we may begin to use it with love and respect." When Leopold
offered this advice he had in mind not merely the nonhuman parts of nature
but the all-encompassing land community that includes people within it. It
was the long-term health of that entire community, Leopold believed, that
deserves our highest respect.
In disputes about private property, rhetoric counts for a great deal.
Narrative also counts, and an acute need exists today for narratives that show
how a new, more ecologically sensitive understanding of private property can
fit together with America's understanding of itself and its history.65 Good
talk about private property, well linked to the common good, can be a
powerful tool for the work that lies ahead.
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